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This paper investigates the stabilization bias that arises in
a model of monetary and ﬁscal policy stabilization of the econ-
omy, when monetary authority puts higher weight on inﬂation
stabilization than society. We demonstrate that inﬂation con-
servatism unambiguously leads to social welfare losses if the
ﬁscal authority acts strategically under discretion. Although
the precise form of monetary-ﬁscal interactions depends on the
leadership structure, the choice of ﬁscal instrument, and the
level of steady-state debt, the assessment of gains is robust
to these assumptions. We develop an algorithm that computes
leadership equilibria in a general framework of LQ RE models
with strategic agents.
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1. Introduction
There is a well-understood policy proposal that the agency charged
with determining monetary policy, usually the central bank, should
be “inﬂation conservative,” by which it is meant that it should have a
higher relative weight on the inﬂation stabilization objective than is
socially optimal. The logic runs as follows. Suppose the policymaker
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must act under discretion. Also suppose, for some reason (and we
nearly always assume some political economy issues here), it wants
to have lower unemployment (or equivalently higher output). Such
a policymaker will generate an excessively high equilibriumrate of
inﬂation, a level bias. This is the now-textbook Barro and Gordon
(1983) model. One possible resolution of this problem is to make
the central bank both independent and inﬂation conservative, as
famously shown by Rogoﬀ (1985). This removes some of the incen-
tive to reduce unemployment, and hence reduces the inﬂation bias.
This analysis, and its myriad extensions, has been very inﬂuential:
most central banks in developed countries are now operationally
(or at least target) independent. Even so, central banks are often
bestowed with the soubriquet “conservative” in the popular press,
even if mitigating the inﬂationary bias is not quite what journalists
have in mind.
There seems little doubt that major central banks do not pursue
excessive output targets and none of them aims to stabilize inﬂa-
tion at too high a level. Contemporary policymakers demonstrate
considerable agreement about what the targets of policy should be.
Nonetheless, in dynamic models a stabilization bias might still arise.
If a policymaker acts under discretion, then the volatility of welfare-
relevant economic variables is necessarily higher than if it acts under
commitment; see Currie and Levine (1993). Svensson (1997) calls
the diﬀerence in the welfare “stabilization bias” and demonstrates,
once again, that delegating policy to a conservative central bank
could still lead to an improved outcome. Clarida, Gal´ı, and Gertler
(1999) show that an inﬂation-conservative monetary authority that
acts under discretion can achieve the same level of welfare as under
the optimal precommitment-to-rules policy. In other words, the sta-
bilization bias can be reduced: making the central bank inﬂation
conservative helps solve the problem of optimal delegation.1 It seems
reasonable to conclude that the conservative central bank proposal is
a good one, as it deals with both the level and the stabilization bias.
However, it would be naive to assume that an independent
inﬂation-conservative central bank eliminates any inﬂuence of
1The optimal delegation is usually described as a possibility to distort targets
of a discretionary policymaker so that it can achieve higher social welfare than
it would achieve if it were benevolent.
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government, which, after all, still controls the scal instruments of
nancial management. It may deviate from what is socially optimal
and, say, have a lower unemployment target or prefer more stable
growth. Even if it remains entirely benevolent, it may still behave
strategically,2 which can aﬀect the resulting equilibrium. Both level
and stabilization bias can still arise.
Indeed, Dixit and Lambertini (2003), using a static Barro-
Gordon type model, demonstrate that a conﬂict of interests does
make the outcome suboptimal in a model of monetary-ﬁscal inter-
actions with a conservative central bank and a benevolent ﬁscal
authority. The level bias still arises: the levels of inﬂation and unem-
ployment in steady-state equilibrium are both higher than socially
optimal. With an additional policymaker, it seems the conservative
central bank proposal does not work out even in a static model.3
Similarly, the conservative central bank solution to an optimal del-
egation problem in a dynamic stochastic environment could also be
misleading if potentially strategic play by policymakers is ignored.4
In further related research, Adam and Billi (2008) examine the
advantages of inﬂation conservatism using a non-linear dynamic
model similar to ours and ﬁnd that it can be beneﬁcial. However,
they mostly study the implications for the steady state, and limit
their analysis of stabilization bias to the case of strategic ﬁscal lead-
ership and a ﬂexible-price version of the model. By contrast, our
paper is concerned with the stabilization aspects of the problem and
can be seen as a complement to their paper.
2There is little doubt that the scal authorities can act strategically: An exist-
ing empirical literature on monetary-scal interactions suggests that scal policy
does more than simply allow automatic stabilizers to operate; see, e.g., Auerbach
(2003) and Favero and Monacelli (2005), who analyze scal policy in the United
States. Moreover, since the onset of European monetary union, there are calls for
greater scal exibility, although how strategic such authorities should be is not
explicitly discussed.
3These results were further developed in Lambertini (2006) specically for the
conservative central bank proposal. See also Hughes Hallett, Libich, and Stehlik
(2009).
4Of course, most policy authorities (the central bank and the scal authority)
would quite rightly deny that they play games. However, by playing a game
we mean that we model the ability of each authority to understand the others
priorities and reaction functions.
44 International Journal of Central Banking June 2011
Making the model dynamic furthers the analysis on two accounts.
First, we argue that there is now a wide consensus about appropriate
level targets for the nancial authorities, so the focus of the policy
debate is oftenhow quickly should they try to achieve these targets,
rather than which targets to achieve. Second, modeling monetary-
ﬁscal interactions in a dynamic setting allows us to study the eﬀect
of the government’s solvency constraint. Debt stabilization issues
can impose severe restrictions on the stabilization abilities of both
authorities (see Leeper 1991), but it is very diﬃcult to model these
restrictions adequately in a static model.5
In this paper we explore the importance of both strategic behav-
ior and inﬂation conservatism in a linear-quadratic rational expecta-
tions (LQ RE) inﬁnite-horizon dynamic model of a kind widely used
in policy analysis. We employ a conventional model with monop-
olistic competition and sticky prices in the goods markets (as in
Woodford 2003a, ch. 6), extended to include ﬁscal policy and nomi-
nal government debt. We allow both authorities to act strategically
and non-cooperatively in pursuit of their own objectives. We then
delegate monetary policy to an inﬂation-conservative central bank.
We demonstrate that even if the ﬁscal authority remains benevolent
but acts strategically, delegating monetary policy in this way leads
to welfare losses. The basic intuition is that if the authorities’ objec-
tives do not coincide, then one strategic policymaker can oﬀset the
policy of the other. We show that although a small degree of con-
servatism can be harmless, greater conservatism leads to substantial
welfare losses.
As in Dixit and Lambertini (2003), the quantitative outcome
of the game depends on the leadership structure. We study three
possibilities: either the monetary or ﬁscal authorities lead or they
move simultaneously (play a Nash game). This analysis is impossi-
ble to conduct without developing an appropriate modeling frame-
work. Because an even moderately complicated dynamic model
needs to be solved using numerical methods and these methods are
neither readily available nor well articulated for models with rational
5Beetsma and Bovenberg (2006) introduce public debt into a two-period
model. Their results are not readily comparable with ours, as they focus their
research on the dynamic of public debt and use an ad hoc welfare metric.
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expectations,6 we develop relevant solution methods for discretionary
equilibria in dynamic linear rational expectations models where we
make the role of leadership explicit. Although this is a key contribu-
tion of the paper and a necessary step in our analysis, we relegate
detailed discussion to appendix 1.
This paper diﬀers from Dixit and Lambertini (2003) and Adam
and Billi (2008) in four important respects. First, we study the stabi-
lization rather than the level bias, and focus on dynamics rather than
the steady state. Second, we examine diﬀerent leadership regimes,
and provide suitable algorithms for calculating appropriate equilib-
ria. In so doing we solve a rather general LQ RE model within a
class of dynamic models commonly used by policymakers. Third,
we explicitly account for the eﬀects of potential ﬁscal insolvency.
Finally, we show how the interaction of the two authorities depends
on the steady-state level of debt.
Our results are in marked contrast to the received wisdom
outlined above. We ﬁnd that if the ﬁscal authority is benevo-
lent but acts strategically, then delegating monetary policy to an
inﬂation-conservative agency usually increases stabilization bias and
so reduces social welfare. Any distortion to the social objectives can
bring the two policymakers into conﬂict with each other in a way
that nearly always reduces social welfare for our model. The message
is clear: What works well in an economy with a single policymaker
may not work at all in an economy with two strategic policymak-
ers. Our assessment of the gains from delegation seems robust to
the speciﬁcation of the model and the choice of ﬁscal policy instru-
ment. We conduct sensitivity analysis over the model, and show
that whilst there are diﬀerences in the behavior of ﬁscal policy if we
choose either distortionary taxes or spending, the qualitative results
are the same. However, there is an issue about the steady-state level
of debt. The low- and high-debt cases (deﬁned below) have quite
diﬀerent qualitative eﬀects.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we present
the model and deﬁne the private-sector equilibrium. In section 3 we
discuss policy design: the choice of instruments, policy objectives,
6de Zeeuw and van der Ploeg (1991) provide an excellent discussion of discrete
dynamic games which can be compared with our analysis.
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the degree of precommitment, and the leadership structure. Cali-
bration of the model is explained in section 4. Section 5 presents
the analysis of the benchmark regime with non-cooperative benev-
olent policymakers, where we compare the outcome of benevolent
discretionary policymaking to a solution under commitment with
full cooperation of the authorities. In section 6 we study the eﬀect of
an inﬂation conservatism of the monetary authorities on welfare, and
we contrast this case to the case of cooperation of benevolent pol-
icymakers under discretion. The analysis in these sections assumes
the ﬁscal authorities use spending as a ﬁscal instrument. Section 7
investigates how our results change if ﬁscal policy uses tax as an
instrument instead or together with spending. Section 8 concludes.
2. The Model
We consider the now-mainstream macro policy model, discussed in
Woodford (2003a), modiﬁed to take account of the eﬀects of ﬁscal
policy. It is a closed-economy model with two policymakers—the
ﬁscal and monetary authorities. Fiscal policy is allowed to support
monetary policy in stabilization of the economy around the steady
state.
2.1 Private Sector
2.1.1 Consumers
The economy is inhabited by a large number of households who spe-
cialize in the production of a diﬀerentiated good (indexed by z) and
who spend h(z) of eﬀort in its production. They consume a basket of
goods C, and derive utility from per capita government consumption
G. The household’s maximization problem is
max
{Cs,hs}∞s=t
Et
∞
∑
s=t
βs−t[u(Cs) + f(Gs) − v(hs(z))]. (1)
The price of a diﬀerentiated good z is denoted by p(z), and the
aggregate price level is P . All households consume the same basket
of goods. Goods are aggregated into a Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) con-
sumption index with the elasticity of substitution between any pair
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of goods given byt > 1 (which is a stochastic7 elasticity with mean
), Ct =
  1
0 c
 t 1
 t
t (z)dz

 t
 t 1 .
A household chooses consumption and work eﬀort to maximize
criterion (1) subject to the demand system and the intertemporal
budget constraint:
Et


s=t
Qt,s PsCs  A t+Et


s=t
Qt,s {(1Υ s)(Ws(z)hs(z)+Πs(z)))+TR},
where Pt Ct =
 1
0 p(z)c(z)dz is nominal consumption, A t are nomi-
nal ﬁnancial assets of a household, Πt is proﬁt and TR is a constant
lump-sum tax or subsidy. Here W is the wage rate, and Υt is a tax
rate on income. Qt,t +1 is the stochastic discount factor which deter-
mines the price in period t to the individual of being able to carry
a state-contingent amount A t +1 of wealth into period t + 1. The
riskless short-term nominal interest rate it is represented in terms
of the stochastic discount factor as Et (Qt,t +1 ) = (1 + it )1 .
We assume that the net present value of future income is bounded
and that the nominal interest rate is positive at all times. Optimiza-
tion for the household requires it to exhaust its intertemporal budget
constraint, with wealth accumulation satisfying the no-Ponzi-game
condition lim
s
Et (Qt,s A s) = 0. We assume the speciﬁc functional
form for the utility-from-consumption component, u(Cs) =
C 11/s
11/ ,
so household optimization leads to the following dynamic relation-
ship for aggregate consumption:
Ct = Et

1
β
Pt +1
Pt
Qt,t +1


Ct+1

. (2)
Additionally, aggregate (nominal) asset accumulation is given by
A t +1 = (1 + it )(A t + (1  Υt )(Wt Nt + Πt )  Pt Ct  TR),
where Wt and Nt are aggregate wage and employment.
We linearize equation (2) around the steady state (here and
everywhere below for each variable Xt with steady-state value X,
7We make this parameter stochastic to allow us to generate shocks to the
markup of rms, as did, e.g., Beetsma and Jensen (2004).
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we use the notation Xt = ln(Xt /X)). Equation (2) leads to the
following Euler equation (intertemporal IS curve):
Cˆt = Et Cˆt +1  σ(ˆıt  E t πˆt +1 ). (3)
Inﬂation is πt = P tP t1  1, and we ensure steady-state inﬂation is
zero by appropriate transfers (Woodford 2003a).
2.1.2 Firms
Price setting is based on Calvo contracting as set out in Woodford
(2003a). Each period, ﬁrms are allowed to recalculate their prices
with probability 1  γ, so that they remain ﬁxed with probability
γ. Following Woodford (2003a) we can derive the following Phillips
curve for our economy8:
πˆt = βEt πˆt+1 +
(1  γβ)(1  γ)ψ
γ(ψ + )
sˆt , (4)
where marginal cost is
sˆt =
1
ψ
Yˆt +
1
σ
Cˆt +
τ
(1  τ)
Υˆt + ηˆt .
The shock ηˆt is a markup shock and parameter ψ = vy/vyy y.
Parameter τ is the steady-state level of tax rate.
Under ﬂexible prices and in the steady state, the real wage is
always equal to the monopolistic markup μt = (1  t )/t . Opti-
mization by consumers then implies
μw
μt
=
ynt (z)
1/

1  Υˆnt
	
Cnt
	 1−1/ , (5)
where superscript n denotes natural levels (see Woodford 2003a),
and μw is a steady-state employment subsidy which we discuss
below. Linearization of (5) and aggregation yields
Yˆ nt
1
ψ
+ Cˆnt
1
σ
+
τ
(1  τ)
Υˆnt = 0.
8The derivation is identical to the one in Woodford (2003a), amended by the
introduction of markup shocks as in Beetsma and Jensen (2004).
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2.2 Government
The government buys consumption goods Gt, taxes income with tax
rate Υt, raises lump-sum taxes T , pays an employment subsidy μw,
and issues nominal debt Bt. Debt is assumed to be one period with
a risk-free rate of return. The evolution of the nominal debt stock
Bt is
Bt+1 = (1 + it)(Bt + PtGt − ΥtPtYt − T + μw). (6)
The lump-sum taxes (T ) and employment subsidy (μw = T ) are
constant and cannot be used to balance the budget or stabilize the
economy.
Equation (6) can be linearized as follows:
b˜t+1 = χıˆt +
1
β
(b˜t − χπˆt + (1 − θ)Gˆt − τ(Υˆt + Yˆt)), (7)
where we deﬁned a measure of real debt Bt = Bt/Pt−1 and denoted
the steady-state ratio of debt to output as χ. The steady-state
level of debt is determined from the steady-state version of (6),
χ = θ−(1−τ)(1−β) , and is a function of the steady-state tax rate, τ , and
of the steady-state ratio of consumption to output, θ. We denote
b˜t = χBˆt, which allows us to use the same system if χ = 0; then
b˜t = Bt, and there are no ﬁrst-order eﬀects of either the interest rate
or inﬂation on debt.
2.3 Market Clearing Conditions
Output is distributed as wages and proﬁts:
PtYt = WtNt + Πt.
As government expenditures constitute part of demand, the national
income identity is
Yt = Gt + Ct (8)
and in steady state G = (1 − θ)Y . The linearized national income
identity (or the resource constraint) is then
Yˆt = (1 − θ)Gˆt + θCˆt. (9)
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2.4 Private-Sector Equilibrium
We simplify notation in equations (3), (4), (7), and (9) by using
lowercase letters to denote “gap” variables, where the gap is the dif-
ference between actual levels and natural levels, i.e., xt = Xˆt − Xˆnt .
The ﬁnal system of ﬁrst-order conditions consists of an intertempo-
ral IS curve (10), the Phillips curve (11), national income identity
(12), and an equation explaining the evolution of debt (13):
ct = Etct+1 − σ(it − Etπt+1), (10)
πt = βEtπt+1 + κ
σ
ct +
κ
ψ
yt +
κτ
(1 − τ)τt + ηt, (11)
yt = (1 − θ)gt + θct, (12)
b˜t+1 = χit +
1
β
(b˜t − χπt + (1 − θ)gt − τ(τt + yt)), (13)
where parameter κ = (1−γβ)(1−γ)ψγ(ψ+) .
A private-sector rational expectations equilibrium consists of
plan {ct, πt, b˜t, yt} satisfying equations (10)–(13), given the policies
{it, gt, τt}, the exogenous process {ηt}, and initial conditions b˜0.
3. Monetary and Fiscal Policy Regimes
3.1 Welfare Criterion
We assume that both authorities set their instruments to maximize
the aggregate utility function:
1
2
Et
∞
∑
s=t
βs−t
[
C
1−1/σ
s
1 − 1/σ + ξ
G
1−1/σ
s
1 − 1/σ −
∫ 1
0
h
1+1/ψ
s (z)
1 + 1/ψ
dz
]
. (14)
We show in appendix 2 that problem (14) implies the following
optimization problem for a benevolent policymaker. A benevolent
policymaker minimizes the discounted sum of all future losses:
Lt =
1
2
Et
∞
∑
s=t
βs−tWSs ,
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where the one-period term is
WSs = ρcc
2
s + ρgg
2
s + ρyy
2
s + π
2
s + O(‖ξ‖3) (15)
and O(‖ξ‖3) collects terms of higher order and terms independent of
policy.We normalize the coeﬃcient on inﬂation to one. This quadratic
approximation to social welfare is obtained assuming that there is a
steady-state production subsidy μw = T that eliminates the distor-
tion caused by monopolistic competition and income taxes.9
Note that expression (15) contains a quadratic term in govern-
ment spending, g. This term enters the welfare expression because it
is assumed in (1) that households derive utility from the consump-
tion of public goods, and that the steady-state level of government
spending reﬂects this. However, if we instead assumed that govern-
ment spending was pure waste but the government still used g as a
policy instrument, then changes in g would still inﬂuence social wel-
fare through the national income identity, but it would not constitute
an independent source of welfare loss.
Each policymaker minimizes its own loss functions. If it is benevo-
lent, it adopts the social loss function. Note that when assigning social
welfare (15) to the monetary authority, we do not eliminate quadratic
terms in government spending. This term is not independent of policy,
as monetary policy actions aﬀect ﬁscal policy decisions.
3.2 The Choice of Policy Instruments
Weassume thatmonetary policy uses short-termnominal interest rate
as the policy instrument and that the ﬁscal authority uses govern-
ment spending as its instrument. This follows current convention for
the monetary policymaker, but the choice of ﬁscal instrument is more
arbitrary. Our choice is determined by the following considerations.
First, there is no well-established form of ﬁscal policy rule. Empirical
estimates of ﬁscal policy reaction functions (see Taylor 2000, Auer-
bach 2003, and Favero and Monacelli 2005, for example) suggest that
both government spending and taxes are varied by the ﬁscal author-
ity. Second, from a methodological point of view, using spending is
9This derivation follows Woodford (2003a). Alternative ways of deriving social
welfare (see, for example, Sutherland 2002 and Benigno and Woodford 2004) are
inappropriate for discretionary policy.
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a convenient starting point. We discuss in section 7 how our results
change if we use taxes instead, so, eﬀectively, we look at both possibil-
ities. We shall refer to the income tax rate as “taxes” in what follows.
3.3 The Benchmark Ramsey Allocation
The Ramsey allocation takes into account the presence of distor-
tions, as summarized by the implementability constraints (10)–(11),
the resource constraint (12), and the ﬁnancial constraint (13). Specif-
ically, the Ramsey allocation in the LQ framework solves
min
{it,gt,τt}
1
2
Et
∞
∑
s=t
βs−tWSs
subject to constraints (10)–(13) for all t ≥ 0.
The Ramsey allocation requires commitment to policies and full
cooperation between the authorities. In what follows we term this
the commitment solution. We use the commitment solution as the
benchmark case.
3.4 Discretionary Policy and Non-Cooperative Regimes
We assume that both monetary and ﬁscal authorities act non-
cooperatively in order to stabilize the economy against shocks. Both
authorities are assumed to act under discretion. We assume that the
monetary authority chooses the interest rate to minimize the welfare
loss with per-period metrics in the form of (15) subject to the sys-
tem (10)–(13), and the benevolent ﬁscal authority chooses spending
to minimize the welfare loss (15) subject to the same system.
Of course, if both authorities are benevolent, then they both use
the per-period social loss as their objective function. If the monetary
authority is inﬂation conservative, then it is assumed to deviate from
the microfounded weight on inﬂation variability, so its per-period
objective becomes
WMs = ρcc
2
s + ρgg
2
s + ρyy
2
s + ρππ
2
s + O(‖ξ‖3), (16)
where ρπ ≥ 1.
Each of the policymakers solves an optimization problem every
period. The resulting optimal policy reactions lead to stochastic
equilibria that should be compared across a suitable metric. The
obvious choice is the microfounded social loss.
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The sequence of events and actions within a period is as fol-
lows. At the beginning of every period t, the state b˜t is known and
shock ηt realizes. Then the two policymakers choose the value of
it, gt, and τt. There is a particular order of moves, and we shall
study all possibilities: (i) one of the policymakers moves ﬁrst, and
the leader chooses the best point on the follower’s reaction func-
tion or (ii) both policymakers move simultaneously and neither is
able to exploit the reaction function of the other policymaker. In all
cases, the policymakers know the state b˜t and take the process by
which private agents behave as given. After the policymakers have
moved, in the next stage the private sector simultaneously adjusts
its choice variables πt and ct. The optimal πt, ct and policy it, gt,
and τt result in the new level of b˜t+1 by the beginning of the next
period t + 1.
4. Calibration
We take the model’s frequency to be quarterly. To achieve a steady-
state rate of interest of approximately 4 percent, we set the house-
hold discount rate β to 0.99. The remaining parameters of the utility
function are typical of those used in the literature; see, e.g., Can-
zoneri et al. (2006). The elasticity of intertemporal substitution σ is
taken as 1/1.5, the Calvo parameter γ is set at 0.75 so as to imply
average contracts of about a year, the elasticity of demand is taken
as ε = 7.0 to achieve a 17 percent markup, and elasticity of labor
demand is taken as ψ = 1/3.
The ratio of government consumption to output in the point of
linearization, 1 − θ, is a function of relative weight on the utility-
from-public-consumption term, ξ. We choose to calibrate ξ such that
it would result in realistic 1 − θ = 0.25.
We shall demonstrate that diﬀerent values of χ can result in
qualitatively diﬀerent policy interactions. In what follows, we con-
sider two values for the debt-to-GDP ratio. Our “high” debt level,
χ = 1.2, corresponds to 30 percent of annual output, which is still
less than the level of debt in a number of European economies. How-
ever, we only consider one-period debt, so the ﬁgure of 30 percent
is large enough to demonstrate qualitative diﬀerence with χ = 0,
which corresponds to 0 percent of annual output and which we treat
as “low” debt level.
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The steady-state level of tax rate is a function of the steady-
state debt level, τ = τ(χ). Of course, “high” and “low” level of debt
corresponds to “low” and “high” tax rate.
We only study the eﬀect of cost-push shocks, as they are the
biggest potential source of social loss.10 We calibrate the standard
deviation of an i.i.d. cost-push shock as 0.005. In our baseline case,
this generates a standard deviation for inﬂation of 0.0038, approx-
imately the same order of magnitude as experienced in developed
countries over the last couple of decades. This number is also not
unreasonable given other academic studies. Ireland (2004) uses a
cost-push shock, which is AR(1) with a standard deviation of 0.0044.
Smets and Wouters (2003) report an i.i.d. cost-push shock with a
much smaller standard deviation in the model with inﬂation per-
sistence, while Rudebusch (2002) estimates a standard deviation of
0.01 for an i.i.d. cost-push shock.
5. Benevolent Policymakers
We ﬁrst look at how monetary and ﬁscal policy interact if pol-
icy objectives are not distorted. As we shall see, the qualitative
results crucially depend on calibration of one particular parameter,
the steady-state level of debt. We ﬁnd it convenient to emphasize
this diﬀerence from the very beginning, but we defer the remaining
robustness analysis to section 7.
We assume that both authorities have identical intraperiod social
objectives (15). We solve the optimization problem and ﬁnd optimal
policy and the incurred costs for jointly optimal policies under discre-
tion and under commitment. Figure 1 plots the impulse responses to
a unit cost-push shock for the low- and high-debt cases.11 We report
and discuss several results.
5.1 Commitment vs. Discretion
Optimal policy under commitment, compared with discretionary pol-
icy, requires smaller and smoother movements in policy instruments.
10 We have examined what happens if we introduce taste or productivity shocks,
and all quantitative results are virtually the same.
11 We only show several initial periods. With time, all variables (including debt)
converge back to the steady state.
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Figure 1. Impulse Responses to a Unit Cost-Push Shock
under Cooperative Optimization of Benevolent
Authorities
Note: Fiscal policy uses spending as an instrument.
Commitment policy has control over all future states, including expec-
tations. The policy is chosen once and the policymaker is able to
adhere to it. As a result, the private sector sets expectations that help
stabilization. By promising to keep the interest rate above the base-
line in all future periods, the monetary policymaker is able to achieve
an immediate fall in inﬂation and overall price stability. Also, only a
small initial rise in the interest rate is suﬃcient for this stabilization.
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In contrast, the discretionary policymaker reoptimizes every
period. The discretionary policymaker cannot promise to keep the
interest rate above the baseline in future periods, as the private
sector knows that all future policymakers will reoptimize. The pol-
icymaker, therefore, has no control over private-sector expectations
along the whole future paths. It has to raise the interest rate by
much more in the rst period in order to move all variables su-
ciently close to the steady state already after the rst period. 12 This
distinction in qualitative behavior of commitment and discretionary
policies is well known and is frequently exploited in the design of
delegation schemes—diﬀerent from the one we consider here—that
make discretionary policy smooth to replicate commitment policy
and achieve higher social welfare.13
5.2 Non-Cooperative Discretionary Policy Regimes
All non-cooperative regimes with identical objectives deliver the
same equilibrium. This result shows that strategic behavior can only
be of importance if there is conﬂict in objectives. That the order of
moves is of no importance is a direct consequence of policymakers
having identical objectives given that the equilibrium is unique. In
this setting, neither authority is trying to exploit the other in a
pursuit of their own target—they internalize externalities.14
This result holds because there is a unique discretionary equilib-
rium. By uniqueness we mean that following a shock, the economy
12 The inability of discretionary policy to control expectations of the private
sector about future policy and future states also implies that the choice of pol-
icy instruments might matter. In contrast to Benigno and Woodford (2004), we
cannot use consumption or ination as a policy instrument, as the discretionary
policymaker has no control of their future values.
13 A non-exhaustive list includes Svensson (1997), Walsh (2003), Woodford
(2003b), and Vestin (2006).
14 Formally, it is straightforward to demonstrate that a Nash equilibrium with
identical objectives coincides with the cooperative equilibrium. The system of
rst-order conditions for a single optimization problem with two instruments in
cooperative equilibrium will be identical to the two systems of rst-order condi-
tions for the two separate maximization problems for each of the instruments.
Similarly we can deal with Stackelberg equilibrium: the systems of rst-order con-
ditions will contain some additional terms, but they are all zero if the objectives
are the same.
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follows a unique path which satises the conditions of time consis-
tency and optimality; see appendix 1. This is not an obvious result
a priori given that a similar model with scal policy, which controls
debt by means of anexogenous feedback-on-debt rule, is shown to
have multiple discretionary equilibria in Blake and Kirsanova (2008).
In that model, if the ﬁscal feedback on debt is suﬃciently strong,
so any debt displacement is corrected by ﬁscal means very quickly,
monetary policy behaves in a conventional way. In response to a cost-
push shock, monetary policy raises the interest rate, which leads to
an initial increase in debt and also slows down the debt stabilization
process. The strong ﬁscal feedback ensures the debt stability. If ﬁscal
feedback is zero, so ﬁscal policy does not control debt at all, mone-
tary policy lowers the interest rate in response to a cost-push shock.
As a result, the lower real rate reduces the level of debt below the
steady state. The subsequent increase in the interest rate reduces
output and inﬂation and also pushes debt back to the steady state.
There is an intermediate case where ﬁscal policy controls debt only
weakly, so both monetary regimes are possible.
The multiplicity of regimes is possible because of the comple-
mentarity between the decision variable of the private sector (inﬂa-
tion) and the instrument of the monetary policymaker (the interest
rate) in their eﬀects on debt, as deﬁned in Cooper and John (1988).
Namely, a too-low debt stock can be increased with either a high
interest rate or with low inﬂation, and, crucially, an increase in the
interest rate reduces inﬂation. This complementarity exists in our
model too, but its strength depends on ﬁscal stance: when ﬁscal
feedback is suﬃciently strong, then debt is stabilized by ﬁscal means
and eﬀects of inﬂation and interest rate on the speed of debt sta-
bilization are negligible. In contrast to Blake and Kirsanova (2008),
the ﬁscal authority is a strategic player in our model in this paper,
and it optimally chooses to reduce spending in a response to a higher
interest rate, i.e., chooses suﬃciently strong ﬁscal feedback to put
the economy outside the area of multiple equilibria.15
15 It is easy to prove analytically that the discretionary equilibrium is unique
in the low-debt case, as algebra can be substantially simplied as in Blake and
Kirsanova (2008).
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5.3 The Level and Dynamics of Government Debt
The policy mix very much depends on the steady-state level of debt,
χ. The substantial diﬀerence is in terms of the directions of optimal
responses to the same shock.
In the low-debt case, contractionary monetary policy is sup-
ported by contractionary ﬁscal policy in a response to a positive
cost-push shock. This leads to a rise in debt. Fiscal policy is then
used to bring debt back to the steady state: government spending
stays at a reduced level for a long time.
In the high-debt case, the interest rate falls in the ﬁrst period
in a response to a positive cost-push shock. As the ﬁrst-order eﬀect
of interest rates on debt is large, a fall in interest rates reduces the
level of domestic debt. Moreover, the ﬁscal contraction reduces debt
even further. This ﬁrst-period response allows monetary policy to
raise the interest rate in the second period and reduce inﬂation.
(Note that second-period inﬂation overshoots the steady-state level.
This helps to reduce inﬂation in the ﬁrst period too, as the rational
private sector sets prices lower in anticipation of this lower future
price.) Fiscal policy also raises spending, as this not only stabilizes
debt but also reduces recession caused by high interest rates.
The left panel in ﬁgure 2 demonstrates that the social loss is
a non-monotonic function of χ. This is consistent with a striking
change in the way the stabilization policy works. When χ is below
some threshold level, then any further rise in χ creates more prob-
lems for policymakers if monetary policy raises the interest rate in
response to a cost-push shock. A high interest rate contributes to
debt accumulation, and the eﬀect is proportional to χ. When χ is
below this threshold, the gains from inﬂation stabilization in the
ﬁrst periods after the shock outweigh the losses from the slow stabi-
lization of the economy because of slow debt dynamics. When χ is
above this threshold, it becomes welfare improving to stabilize debt
quicker. Therefore, it becomes optimal to lower the interest rate in
the ﬁrst period after the shock and raise it in the second period. This
policy leads to faster debt stabilization and also curtails inﬂation.
To emphasize the diﬀerence, we have chosen the low- and high-debt
cases on either side of the “hump.”
The dynamic process of debt accumulation plays a very impor-
tant role for the stabilization policy mix. First, its presence imposes
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Figure 2. The Eﬀect of Steady-State Level of Debt on the
Social Loss
Notes: The ﬁgure shows the joint monetary-ﬁscal optimization of benevo-
lent policymakers under discretion. The ﬁscal policymaker uses diﬀerent ﬁscal
instruments.
the requirement on the policy mix to prevent an explosion of debt.
Second, its presence alters the dynamics of stabilization. If there is
no debt, then following a shock a discretionary policy stabilizes the
economy within one period. Policy can only reduce the amplitude of
reactions to shocks within the ﬁrst period. If debt accumulation is
present, then policy can also reduce the half-life of eﬀects of shocks
that have entered the system. In other words, it enables stabilization
to be smoothed over many periods, which may or may not be welfare
improving. With the presence of debt, the private sector’s expecta-
tions aﬀect the economy for more than one period, as the evolution
of debt can be aﬀected by the forecast of future policy. Expectations
set in period t aﬀect the whole future path of state variables and
they aﬀect policy decisions taken in period t + k, k ≥ 1. The way
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Table 1. Social Loss for Diﬀerent Scenarios with Diﬀerent
Fiscal Instruments, % of Steady-State Consumption
Low-Debt Case High-Debt Case
Fiscal Instrument→ G T G&T G T G&T
Commitment 2.03 0.23 0.22 2.05 0.23 0.22
Cooperation under Discretion 2.57 2.56 2.54 2.60 2.83 2.73
Stabilization Bias 0.54 2.34 2.33 0.55 2.60 2.51
monetary policy stabilizes inﬂation in the case of high debt is an
example of how expectations of future policy can be exploited.
The stabilization bias is around 0.5 percent of the steady-state
consumption level that should be given up in order to compensate for
reduced volatility. We compute the stabilization bias as a diﬀerence
between the social loss under discretion and the social loss under
commitment (Ramsey allocation). Table 1 presents more detailed
information. Together with the left panel in ﬁgure 2, the table sug-
gests that the level of debt can aﬀect the size of stabilization bias,
and the order of the eﬀect can be around 0.1 percent of the steady-
state consumption level, which is a relatively big number. We shall
use these numbers as a benchmark. All our future computations
of losses will be relative to the loss under the benevolent discre-
tionary policy, and to obtain the stabilization bias one has to add a
corresponding number from table 1.16
This section has established that with benevolent policymakers,
the order of moves and information structure is of no consequence.
However, there are issues that arise from the dynamic nature of the
model through the steady-state level of debt. In what follows we need
to investigate the importance of steady-state levels of debt together
with the conservative central bank proposal.
6. Conservative Central Bank
Suppose the ﬁscal authorities are benevolent, but we allow the
monetary authorities to place a higher relative weight on inﬂation
16 Here and everywhere else we measure the loss in percentage of steady-state
consumption level.
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Figure 3. Social Welfare Loss as a Function of Monetary
Conservatism for Diﬀerent Non-Cooperative Regimes
Note: Fiscal policy uses spending as an instrument.
stabilization, by adopting objective (16) with ρπ > 1. How does this
aﬀect social welfare? We keep the ﬁscal authorities benevolent.
The left panel of ﬁgure 3 suggests that the loss quickly rises with
the degree of monetary conservatism for all three non-cooperative
regimes; i.e., we can double the stabilization bias very quickly. When
the penalty is very close to one, and in the low-debt case, there is
an extremely small social gain for both regimes of ﬁscal leadership
and of simultaneous moves, but the monetary leadership regime is
unambiguously worse than the cooperation of benevolent authori-
ties. If the steady-state level of debt is large, then there is no social
gain for any degree of inﬂation conservatism and the social loss rises
quickly with the degree of inﬂation conservatism. To understand
these results, it is instructive to look at impulse responses to a unit
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Figure 4. Impulse Responses to a Unit Cost-Push Shock
for Diﬀerent Strategic Regimes if the Monetary Authority
Is Conservative with Small Degree of Conservatism,
ρπ = 0.06
Notes: Fiscal policy uses spending as an instrument. All responses are shown as
relative to those under cooperation.
cost-push shock in ﬁgure 4. We plot diﬀerences with the cooperative
solution, which itself is plotted in ﬁgure 1.
6.1 Simultaneous Policy Decisions
In the low-debt case, the monetary authority reacts more actively to
a cost-push shock than if it were benevolent. It is more concerned
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with inﬂation variability than society and is prepared to pay for gains
with higher variability of the demand-related components. The mon-
etary authority, therefore, raises the interest rate higher to eliminate
inﬂation more aggressively. The benevolent ﬁscal authority tries to
eliminate the resulting recession. It therefore contracts less (expands
more) than if both authorities were benevolent, although inﬂation
is still reduced. The reduction in the cost of inﬂation volatility only
outweighs the cost of ﬁscal volatility if the degree of monetary con-
servatism is extremely small. With a higher degree of conservatism of
the monetary authorities, the implied ﬁscal volatility becomes very
costly.
In the high-debt case, it is optimal for the monetary author-
ity to take into account the debt stabilization issues. It chooses to
reduce the interest rate in the ﬁrst period by more, but the resulting
smaller ﬁscal contraction allows the monetary authorities to then
raise the interest rate by more in the second period without having
an adverse eﬀect on debt. Inﬂation, thus, overshoots more (falls rel-
ative to the cooperative benevolent case) in the second period. It,
therefore, rises less (or falls relative to the cooperative case) in the
ﬁrst period. Again, the reason for its reduction in the ﬁrst period
is the second-period overshooting and the rational expectations of
price setters: A rational private sector perceives the second-period
fall of prices and sets prices low in the ﬁrst period.
The simultaneous-move regime leads to more aggressive policy
than under cooperation, and this results in lower inﬂation but also
in higher volatility for demand-related terms and instruments, and
therefore, in a more costly equilibrium.
6.2 Fiscal Leadership
In the low-debt case, the ﬁscal authority knows that if it contracts
less than in the cooperative scenario, then this will cause the mon-
etary authority to contract more in order to ﬁght excess inﬂation.
Moreover, the monetary authority will contract even more due to
its inherent conservatism. So the ﬁscal authority chooses to contract
only slightly less than in the cooperative scenario. The monetary
authority still contracts more than in the cooperative scenario, and
overall this results in slightly lower inﬂation. Inﬂation falls nearly
as much as under Nash, because ﬁscal authorities do not expand
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as much as under Nash. Debt rises only slightly higher than in the
cooperative scenario, and less than if both authorities move simulta-
neously. With a higher degree of monetary conservatism, the mon-
etary authorities have to pay too high an output and consumption
cost for lower inﬂation, so the regime is unambiguously worse than
full cooperation.
In the high-debt case, the authorities have more problems with
debt stabilization. The ﬁscal authority contracts more in the ﬁrst
period, thus not allowing monetary policy to expand as much as
under Nash. The monetary authority therefore contracts less in
the second period. This creates less inﬂation overshooting than
under Nash. The welfare loss is bigger than under Nash for a
moderate degree of monetary conservatism. However, with a suﬃ-
ciently high degree of conservatism, the monetary-ﬁscal interaction
results in smaller consumption volatility than under Nash, and this
improves welfare slightly. The regime becomes slightly better than
the simultaneous-move regime, although the quantitative response is
extremely close to it. The debt stabilization task dominates the con-
cerns of both authorities and nearly equally constrains instrument
movements in all three non-cooperative regimes.
6.3 Monetary Leadership
In the low-debt case, the leading monetary authority knows that
raising the interest rate causes the ﬁscal authority to try to oﬀset
the resulting recession. This consideration would stop the benevo-
lent monetary authority from raising interest rates. However, as the
monetary authority is conservative, the cost of moving g becomes
relatively less important, so it does raise the interest rate. But it
raises the interest rate less than in the simultaneous-move regime.
Lower pressure on debt allows ﬁscal policy to oﬀset the eﬀect more
eﬃciently. Inﬂation falls less than under Nash and this determines
the loss.
In the high-debt case, the monetary authority contracts more in
the ﬁrst period than under Nash and the ﬁscal authorities have to
reduce spending by more. Debt itself does not fall as much as it does
under Nash. The monetary authority is unable to achieve as large an
inﬂation overshoot in the second period, and the consequent overall
gain in inﬂation stabilization, as under Nash. It is able, however,
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Figure 5. Social Loss as a Function of Conservatism for
Diﬀerent Strategic Regimes and Policy Arrangements
Note: Fiscal policy uses taxes as an instrument or it uses both instruments, taxes
and spending.
to achieve smaller variability of demand-related terms than under
Nash. Both eﬀects taken together result in a smaller welfare loss
than for the simultaneous-move case.
7. Robustness: Using Tax as an Instrument
7.1 Tax as Fiscal Instrument
We have shown how our results change with the level of steady-state
debt. It is also important to look at the choice of ﬁscal instrument.
We rerun our simulations assuming that (i) ﬁscal policy uses tax
as the instrument and (ii) ﬁscal policy uses two instruments, both
income tax rate and spending. Figure 5, which repeats ﬁgure 3 but
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is plotted for taxes (the upper panels) and taxes and spending (the
lower panels), suggests that our main conclusion remains valid: gen-
erally speaking, delegating monetary policy to a conservative central
bank does not improve social welfare.
There are some important dierences with the case where only
spending is used. Consider using tax as a single scal instrument and
suppose that authorities arebenevolent. As taxes aﬀect marginal cost
directly, ﬁscal policy tries to oﬀset any cost-push shocks immediately
by lowering the tax rate. Indeed, the ﬁrst column of plots in ﬁgure
6 suggests that in response to a unit cost-push shock, taxes fall,
and this allows monetary policy to raise the interest rate without
any solvency concerns.17 The debt is also stabilized by taxes: the
ﬁrst-period reduction in the tax rate and high interest rates require
higher taxes in subsequent periods; taxes rise and bring debt back
to the steady state very quickly. As a result, the dynamics of debt is
very diﬀerent from the one in the case where ﬁscal policy can only
use spending as an instrument: debt quickly converges to the steady
state. Taxes have no direct eﬀect on demand and consumption, so
ﬁscal policy can eliminate debt displacement in consequent periods
more eﬃciently with fewer externalities, and monetary policy can
stabilize inﬂation.
Interestingly, the welfare gain from using taxes instead of spend-
ing is very small: the loss under the benevolent discretionary
monetary-ﬁscal policy in the low-debt case is only 0.006 percent
higher if ﬁscal policy uses spending instead of taxes as the only
instrument. Moreover, in the high-debt case, using taxes is more
costly than using spending. To understand these results, it is instruc-
tive to compare them with those under commitment of benevolent
authorities which would deliver the highest welfare in the absence
of dynamic lump-sum taxes. Benigno and Woodford (2004) demon-
strate that ﬁscal policy under commitment is very successful in elim-
inating all eﬀects of a cost-push shock on the economy. These results
are consistent with ours; see the ﬁrst line in table 1: the loss under
the commitment policy falls substantially if taxes are used. Under
17 We have checked that impulse responses are qualitatively similar for all
degrees of conservatism and for low- and high-debt scenarios. So we only present
small conservatism and a low-debt case in gure 6.
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Figure 6. Impulse Responses to a Unit Cost-Push Shock
When Fiscal Policy Uses Diﬀerent Instruments
Notes: Columns 2 and 4 plot relative responses, relative to the case of coop-
eration of benevolent authorities. The “low-debt” scenario and small degree of
conservatism, ρπ = 0.06, are assumed in all cases where applicable.
discretion, however, taxes cannot move as freely as under commit-
ment, and they cannot eﬃciently oﬀset the eﬀect of cost-push shocks,
although they still move in the right direction. The stabilization bias
is large, around 2.5 percent, only because the commitment policy is
so successful.
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The right panel in ﬁgure 2 suggests that with a higher level of
steady-state debt, χ, the social loss rises. The level of χ determines
the size of the ﬁrst-order eﬀect of the interest rate on debt accumula-
tion. With higher χ, the problem of debt stabilization becomes more
diﬃcult. Taxes become predominantly used in the debt stabilization
task; they do not fall by much, and this makes the task of inﬂation
stabilization more diﬃcult for monetary policy.
The relative ranking of diﬀerent leadership regimes barely
changes. The simultaneous-move regime leads to most welfare losses.
However, it is not the most aggressive regime. The second column of
plots in ﬁgure 6 illustrates this. As before, we plot impulse responses
relative to those under cooperation of benevolent policymakers. As
all qualitative responses are very similar for diﬀerent degrees of con-
servatism and for the low- and high-debt scenarios, we only plot the
case with low conservatism and with a low level of debt.
The second column of plots in ﬁgure 6 demonstrates interactions
for diﬀerent leadership regimes in the case of a conservative cen-
tral bank. Under the Nash regime, the monetary authority raises the
interest rate more than if it was benevolent. It also reduces inﬂation
by more and reduces consumption. The optimal response of the ﬁs-
cal authority is to raise taxes. If monetary policy is not taken into
account, then higher taxes would allow the cost-push shock to have
a bigger eﬀect on inﬂation, the real interest rate would fall, and
consumption would rise. In the simultaneous-move regime, the ﬁscal
authority, therefore, reduces taxes by less than it does under coop-
eration. Monetary policy raises the interest rate higher and so on. In
equilibrium, inﬂation is reduced but consumption falls. For a small
degree of conservatism, the gain of lower inﬂation outweighs the loss
of lower consumption and output, but consumption volatility rises
very fast with the degree of monetary conservatism, and the regime
quickly becomes welfare inferior.
If the monetary authority leads, it knows that the ﬁscal author-
ity will not reduce taxes as if it were benevolent, so it raises the
interest rate by less and the ﬁscal authority reduces tax by less than
under Nash. This leads to nearly the same outcome as under Nash
if the degree of conservatism is small. With a higher degree of con-
servatism, policy aggressiveness leads to more volatility in consump-
tion, which is still less than under Nash. So the monetary leadership
regime is preferable over the Nash regime.
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If the ﬁscal authority leads, it knows that the monetary author-
ity will raise interest rates, so it consequently reduces taxes by
more. It explicitly exploits the monetary policy reaction function:
the monetary authority raises the interest rate, but by less then
if it were benevolent because the ﬁscal authority does part of the
disinﬂation. As a result of these ﬁrst-period movements, debt rises
higher. Fiscal policy thus has to respond by raising taxes in the
second period, which also results in higher inﬂation in the second
period. If the degree of monetary conservatism is small, then the
ﬁscal leadership regime delivers the lowest loss among the three
non-cooperative regimes, because of the relatively large fall in inﬂa-
tion. The second-period inﬂation hike, however, dominates the large
social welfare loss if the monetary authority has a higher degree of
conservatism.
Neither of the non-cooperative regimes can be deﬁned as the
most aggressive here: the Nash regime results in higher variability
in the interest rate while the ﬁscal leadership regime results in the
biggest volatility of the ﬁscal instrument.
7.2 Tax and Spending as Fiscal Instruments
Adding government spending as the second ﬁscal instrument does
not change any of the welfare results, as the two lower plots in
ﬁgure 5 demonstrate. An inﬂation-conservative monetary authority,
generally speaking, generates social welfare loss. If the authorities
are benevolent, then the social loss is only marginally smaller than
the loss from stabilization if only taxes are used; see table 1.
The similarity is also apparent from impulse responses shown in
the last two columns of plots in ﬁgure 6. As debt is now stabilized
by taxes, spending is optimally chosen to help monetary policy to
reduce inﬂation if the authorities are benevolent. If there are dis-
torted objectives, then interest rate/tax interactions are nearly the
same as if tax were the only ﬁscal instrument. The possibility to
use spending as well makes little diﬀerence: spending plays the same
role (relative to the case of cooperation of benevolent policymakers)
as in the scenario where it was the only ﬁscal instrument; one can
compare the last column of plots in ﬁgure 6 with the ﬁrst column of
plots in ﬁgure 4.
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8. Summary of Results and Conclusions
This paper presents a detailed account of discretionary monetary
and ﬁscal policy interactions in a fully speciﬁed intertemporal gen-
eral equilibrium model with particular emphasis on non-cooperative
interactions under inﬂation conservatism of the monetary authority.
We demonstrate that if the ﬁscal policymaker is benevolent but
acts strategically, then delegating monetary policy to a policymaker
that puts a higher than socially optimal weight on inﬂation stabiliza-
tion generally increases the stabilization bias. Such a distortion of the
otherwise social objectives of one policymaker brings the two policy-
makers into conﬂict with each other, and this is welfare destructive.
This example demonstrates that what works well in an economy
with one strategic policymaker may not work at all in an economy
with two strategic policymakers, as the second strategic policymaker
can oﬀset all actions of the ﬁrst one and vice versa.
Of course, this result does not imply that the problem of optimal
delegation has no solution if there are several strategic policymakers.
We have studied only one particular delegation scheme: the conser-
vative central bank scenario. We have distorted the relative weights
on social objectives, but we did not introduce any additional objec-
tives in order to have a simple and clear experiment. Additional
non-microfounded terms in policymakers’ objectives (like instrument
costs) or the use of diﬀerent policy instruments (like VAT or a con-
sumption tax) might have diﬀerent eﬀects on the ability and will-
ingness of the policymakers to engage in conﬂict with each other.
Diﬀerent degrees of precommitment may aﬀect the degree of con-
ﬂict too. We leave these and similar issues for future research. Our
result, however, suggests that making ﬁscal authorities ﬂexible and
strategic may have costs, and these should be taken into account.
We also show how conﬂict arises if the weights on social objectives
are changed but all objectives remain social.
To arrive at our main conclusions, we have investigated monetary
and ﬁscal policy interactions under discretion in a fairly standard
model with an explicit budget constraint for the ﬁscal authority.
The analysis also yields some additional insights.
First, the choice of ﬁscal instrument is important, although not
for assessing gains from delegation where there are losses what-
ever the ﬁscal instrument. The transmission mechanism diﬀers
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considerably: (i) Taxes are most useful in stabilizing debt, and the
way they are optimally used does not depend on the level of steady-
state debt, and (ii) spending has more limited powers to stabilize
debt, but has a large eect on domestic demand. If spending is
the only scal instrument, then the size of steady-state debt has
an important qualitative eect on policy interactions. If the steady-
state level of debt is high, then monetary policy has to take an active
part in debt stabilization.
Second, among the three non-cooperative regimes, the Nash one
is unlikely to be welfare dominating. In most cases, this regime leads
to large movements of the policy instruments, which typically implies
increased volatility of the key economic variables. Most of our results
suggest that monetary leadership is relatively better if the monetary
authority is ination conservative, but this hinges on the social wel-
fare metric and requires that ination stabilization has far greater
weight than any other target variable.
Finally, this paper oers an additional contribution to the litera-
ture: we oer a methodological approach to solving a non-cooperative
leadership equilibria in an LQ RE model with two policymakers. This
approach can be easily modied to study dierent types of equilibria
and interactions of many agents, say in a multi-country setting.
Appendix 1. Leadership Equilibria under Discretion
This section demonstrates how to solve non-cooperative dynamic
games in the linear-quadratic rational expectations framework. Our
deﬁnition of discretionary policy is conventional and is widely used
in the monetary policy literature; see, e.g., Oudiz and Sachs (1985),
Backus and Driﬃll (1986), Clarida, Gal´ı, and Gertler (1999), and
Woodford (2003a). Currie and Levine (1993) demonstrate how to
solve Nash games. We therefore only describe leadership equilibria.18
Discretionary Policy
We assume a non-singular linear deterministic rational expecta-
tions model, augmented by a vector of control instruments.19
18 A simultaneous-move regime will be a particular case of the leadership regime.
19 None of the results presented here depend on the deterministic setup outlined
and the consequent assumption of perfect foresight. Shocks can be included into
vector yt ; see, e.g., Anderson et al. (1996) and Blake and Kirsanova (2008).
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Speciﬁcally, the evolution of the economy is explained by the linear
system
[
yt+1
xt+1
]
=
[
A11 A12
A21 A22
] [
yt
xt
]
+
[
B11 B12
B21 B22
] [
uLt
uFt
]
, (17)
where yt is an n1-vector of predetermined variables with initial con-
ditions y0 given, xt is an n2-vector of non-predetermined (or jump)
variables with limt→∞ xt = 0, and uFt and u
L
t are the two vectors
of policy instruments of two policymakers, named F and L, of size
kF and kL, respectively. For notational convenience we deﬁne the
n-vector zt = (y′t, x
′
t)
′, where n = n1 + n2, and the k-vector of con-
trol variables ut = (uL′t , u
F ′
t )
′, where k = kF + kL. We assume the
equations are ordered so that A22 is non-singular.
Typically, the second block of equations in this system represents
an aggregation of the ﬁrst-order conditions to the optimization prob-
lem of the private sector, which has decision variables xt. Addition-
ally, there is a ﬁrst block of equations which explains the evolution
of the predetermined state variables yt. These two blocks describe
the “evolution of the economy” as observed by policymakers.
The intertemporal welfare criterion of policymaker i, i ∈ {L,F},
is deﬁned by the quadratic loss function
W it =
1
2
∞
∑
s=t
βs−t
(
gi′s Qigis
)
=
1
2
∞
∑
s=t
βs−t
(
z′sQ
izs + 2z′sP
ius + u′sR
ius
)
.
(18)
The elements of vector gis are the goal variables of policymaker i,
gis = Ci(z′s, u′s)′. Matrix Qi is assumed to be symmetric and positive
semi-deﬁnite.
Assumption 1. Suppose that at any time t, the private sector and
policymakers respond only to the current state
uLt = FL(yt) = −FLyt, (19)
uFt = FF (yt) = −FF yt, (20)
xt = N (yt) = −Nyt. (21)
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This assumption rules out non-stationarity of policy and
private-sector decisions—i.e., any time dependence from the
more general formulation uit = F i(t; yt, yt−1, .., yt−k, ..), xt =
N (t; yt, yt−1, .., yt−k, ..)—and restricts policy decisions to memory-
less feedback rules. We also assume that rules are linear in the
state.
We deﬁne discretionary policy as satisfying several constraints.
We want to assume that the policymaker can implement at each
point of time its policy decision before the private sector selects its
own action xt.
Assumption 2. At each time t, the private sector observes the cur-
rent decision ut and expects that future policymakers at any time
s > t will reoptimize, will apply the same decision process, and
implement policy (19)–(20).
Proposition 1. Given assumption 2, the current aggregate decision
of the private sector can be written as a linear feedback function
xt = −Jyt − Kut = −Jyt − KFuFt − KLuLt , (22)
where
J = (A22 + NA12)−1(A21 + NA11), (23)
KF = (A22 + NA12)−1(B22 + NB12), (24)
KL = (A22 + NA12)−1(B21 + NB11). (25)
Proof. Relationship (21) can be taken with one lead forward, and
yt+1 is substituted from the ﬁrst equation (17). We obtain
xt+1 = −Nyt+1 = −N(A11yt + A12xt + B11uLt + B12uFt )
= A21yt + A22xt + B21uLt + B22u
F
t ,
from where it follows
xt = −(A22 + NA12)−1
(
(A21 + NA11)yt + (B22 + NB12)uFt
+ (B21 + NB11)uLt
)
= −Jyt − Kut,
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where J and K = (KF ,KL) are deﬁned as in (23)–(25). Invertibility
of A22 ensures invertibility of A22 + NA12 almost surely.
Proposition 1 implies that the policymakers, which move before
the private sector, take into account their “instantaneous” inﬂuence
on the choice of xt, which is measured by −K.
Assumption 3. At each time t, policymaker F knows assumptions
1 and 2 and observes the current decision uLt of policymaker L.
Proposition 2. Given assumption 3, the current decision of poli-
cymaker F can be written as a linear feedback function:
uFt = −Gyt − DuLt . (26)
Proof. We shall prove it as part of proof of proposition 3.
Proposition 2 implies that policymaker L, which moves before
the private sector and before policymaker F , takes into account its
“instantaneous” inﬂuence on the choice of uFt , which is measured by
−D. It immediately follows that
FF = G − DFL. (27)
Assumption 4. At each point in time t, policymaker L knows
assumptions 1, 2, and 3.
Definition 1. Policies determined by (19)–(20) are discretionary
(under intraperiod leadership of policymaker L) if each policymaker
ﬁnds it optimal to continue to follow its policy in every period s > t,
given assumptions 1–4.
Policy of the Follower. The policy of the follower, uFt , satisﬁes
the following Bellman equation:
V Ft (yt) = min
uFt
(
1
2
(
y′sQˆyt + 2y
′
tPˆut + u
′
tRˆut
)
+ βV Ft+1(Aˆyt + Bˆut)
)
,
(28)
with
Qˆ = QF11 − QF12J − J ′QF21 + J ′QF22J,
Pˆ1 = J ′QF22K
L − QF12KL + PF11 − J ′PF21,
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Pˆ2 = J ′QF22K
F − QF12KF + PF12 − J ′PF22,
Rˆ11 = KL′QF22K
L − KL′PF21 − PF ′21 KL + RF11,
Rˆ12 = KL′QF22K
F − KL′PF22 − PF ′21 KF + RF12,
Rˆ22 = KF ′QF22K
F + RF22 − KF ′P22 − PF ′22 KF ,
Aˆ = A11 − A12J,
Aˆ1 = B11 − A12KL,
Bˆ2 = B12 − A12KF .
Here we take the intraperiod leadership of the policymaker into
account by substituting in constraint (22), but we treat uLt as given.
Because of the quadratic nature of the per-period objective in
(18) and because policy and private-sector decisions are linear in
the state, the discounted loss will necessarily have quadratic form
in the state
V Ft (yt) =
1
2
y′tS
F yt.
The Bellman equation characterizing discretionary policy of policy-
maker F , therefore, becomes
y′tS
F yt = min
uFt
(
y′t(Qˆ + βAˆ
′SF Aˆ)yt + 2y′t(Pˆ + βAˆ
′SF Bˆ)ut
+ u′t(Rˆ + βBˆ
′SF Bˆ)ut
)
. (29)
Policy of the Leader. For the leader, policy uLt satisﬁes the
following Bellman equation:
V Lt (yt) = min
uLt
(
1
2
(
y′sQ˜yt + 2y
′
tP˜u
L
t + u
L′
t R˜u
L
t
)
+ βV Lt+1
(
A˜yt + B˜uLt
)
)
,
(30)
with
Q˜ = QL11 − PL12G − G′PL′12 + G′RL22FF − QL12J˜ − J˜ ′QL′12
+ G′PL′22 J˜ + J˜
′PL22G + J˜
′QL22J˜ ,
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P˜ = PL11 + J˜
′QL22K˜ − QL12K˜ + G′PL′22 K˜ − PL12D − G′RL21
+ G′RL22D − J˜ ′PL21 + J˜ ′PL22D,
R˜ = RL11 + K˜
′QL22K˜ − RL12D − L′RL21 + L′RL22D − K˜ ′PL21
+ K˜ ′PL22D − PL′21 K˜ + D′PL′22 K˜,
J˜ = J − KFG,
K˜ = KL − KFD,
A˜ = A11 − B12G − A12J˜ ,
B˜1 = B11 − B12D − A˜12K˜,
B˜2 = B21 − B22D.
Here we take the intraperiod leadership of the policymaker into
account by substituting in constraints (22) and (26). Similarly,
V Lt (yt) =
1
2
y′tS
Lyt,
and the Bellman equation characterizing discretionary policy of pol-
icymaker L becomes
y′tS
Lyt = min
uLt
(
y′s(Q˜ + βA˜
′SLA˜)yt + 2y′t(P˜ + βA˜
′SLB˜)uLt
+ uL′t (R˜ + βB˜
′SLB˜)uLt
)
. (31)
For a policy FL, FF and the private-sector response N , the
evolution of the state variable satisﬁes the following equation:
yt+1 = Myt, (32)
where M = A11 − A12N − B11FL − B12FF .
Discretionary Equilibrium as a Matrix Sextuple
Given y0 and system matrices A and B, matrices N , FL, G, and D
deﬁne the trajectories {ys, xs, us}∞s=t in a unique way and vice versa:
if we know that {ys, xs, us}∞s=t solve the discretionary optimization
problem stated above, then, by construction, there are unique time-
invariant linear relationships between them which we label as N , FL,
G, and D. Matrices SL, SF deﬁne the cost to go along a trajectory
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for each policymaker. Given the one-to-one mapping between equi-
librium trajectories and {ys, xs, us}∞s=t and the sextuple of matrices
T = {N,FL, G,D, SL, SF }, it is convenient to continue with the
deﬁnition of policy equilibrium in terms of T , not trajectories.
The following proposition derives the ﬁrst-order conditions for a
discretionary optimization problem.
Proposition 3 (First-Order Conditions). The ﬁrst-order conditions
to the optimization problem (17)–(18) can be written in the following
form:
N = (A22 + NA12)−1((A21 − B22FF − B21FL
+ N(A11 − B12FF − B11FL)), (33)
SF = Qˆ − 2Pˆ1FL − 2Pˆ2FF + FL′Rˆ11FL + 2FL′Rˆ12FF
+ FF ′Rˆ22FF + βAˆ′SF Aˆ − 2βAˆ′SF (Bˆ1FL + Bˆ2FF )
+ βFL′1 Bˆ
′SF (Bˆ1FL + Bˆ2FF ) + βFF ′Bˆ′2S
F Bˆ2F
F , (34)
G =
(
Rˆ22 + βBˆ′2S
F Bˆ2
)−1(
Pˆ ′2 + βBˆ
′
2S
F Aˆ
)
, (35)
D =
(
Rˆ22 + βBˆ′2S
F Bˆ2
)−1(
Pˆ ′1 + βBˆ
′
2S
F Bˆ1
)
, (36)
SL = Q˜ + βA˜′SLA˜ − 2(P˜ + βA˜′SLB˜)FL
+ FL′(R˜ + βB˜′SLB˜)FL, (37)
FL = (R˜ + βB˜′SLB˜)−1(P˜ ′ + βA˜′SLB˜), (38)
where matrices FF , Qˆ, Pˆ , Rˆ, Aˆ, Bˆ, Q˜, P˜ , R˜, A˜, and B˜ are deﬁned
by (28) and (30).
Proof. From relationships (21), (22), and (27), it immediately fol-
lows that
N = J − KFG + KFDFL − KLFL. (39)
A straightforward substitution of (23)–(25) and (27) into (39) leads
to (33).
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The optimal policy of policymaker F can be determined from
(29) by diﬀerentiating the loss function with respect to uFt :
uFt = −
(
Rˆ22 + βBˆ′2S
F Bˆ2
)−1((
Pˆ ′2 + βBˆ
′
2S
F Aˆ
)
yt
+
(
Pˆ ′1 + βBˆ
′
2S
F Bˆ1
)
uLt
)
,
from where the policymaker’s reaction function is deﬁned by (35)
and (36). We simultaneously proved proposition 2. We substitute
the reaction rules (19), (26), (35), and (36) in (29) and obtain
equation (34).
The optimal policy (38) of policymaker L can be determined
from (31) by diﬀerentiating the loss function with respect to uLt . We
substitute the solution into (31) and obtain (37) for SL.
Definition 2. The sextuple T = {N,FL, G,D, SL, SF } is a discre-
tionary equilibrium under intraperiod leadership of policymaker L if
it satisﬁes the system of ﬁrst-order conditions (33)–(38).
Deﬁnition 2 implicitly assumes that the ﬁrst-order conditions
are necessary and suﬃcient conditions of optimality. However, it is
straightforward to demonstrate that under the assumption of sym-
metric positive semi-deﬁnite Qi, the second-order conditions for the
minimum are almost surely satisﬁed for each policymaker; see, e.g.,
Blake and Kirsanova (2008).
Numerical Solution
One way to search for discretionary equilibrium is to use an algo-
rithm similar to the one in Oudiz and Sachs (1985) and Backus
and Driﬃll (1986). We initialize the matrices {N0, SL0 , SF0 } and then
solve the non-linear system of ﬁrst-order conditions (33)–(38) using
an appropriate iterative scheme. This algorithm can be interpreted
as search for equilibria that are “iterative-expectations stable” under
joint learning; see Dennis and Kirsanova (2010). Alternatively, one
can iterate between the solution to (33) that describes the response
of the private-sector given policy, and the solution to (34)–(38) that
describes the best policy given the response of the private sector; see
Blake and Kirsanova (2008).
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Appendix 2. Social Welfare
The procedure to derive the appropriate welfare metric is standard
and explained in Woodford (2003a). The one-period (ﬂow) welfare
in (14) is Wt:
Wt = u(Ct) + f(Gt) −
∫ 1
0
v(yt(z))dz.
Around the steady state, a quadratic approximation to this is
Wt = CuC(C)
(
Cˆt +
1
2
(
1 − 1
σ
)
Cˆ2t
)
+ GfG(G)
(
Gˆt +
1
2
(
1 − 1
σ
)
Gˆ2t
)
− Y vy(Y )
(
Yˆt +
1
2
(
1 +
1
ψ
)
Yˆ 2t +
1
2
(
1
ψ
+
1

)
varz yˆt(z)
)
.
(40)
Further, a second-order approximation of aggregate demand (8) can
be written as
Cˆ =
1
θ
(
Yˆ − (1 − θ)Gˆ − θ1
2
Cˆ2 − 1
2
(1 − θ)Gˆ2 + 1
2
Yˆ 2
)
,
so we can substitute consumption in (40) and obtain
Ws = θuC
((
1 − vy
uC
)
Yˆs − (1 − θ)
(
1 − fG
uC
)
Gˆs
− (1 − θ)
2
(
1 +
fG
uC
(1 − σ)
σ
)
Gˆ2s −
θ
2σ
Cˆ2
−1
2
(
vy
uC
1 + ψ
ψ
− 1
)
Yˆ 2s −
1
2
vy
uC
ψ + 
ψ
varz yˆs(z)
)
.
To transform this equation into a more convenient form that
does not include linear terms, we proceed as follows (see Beetsma
and Jensen 2005). If the government removes monopolistic distor-
tions and distortions from income taxation in the steady state using
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a subsidy20 μw = μ(1−τ) , then uC/vy = fG/uC = 1 so the linear
terms in (40) drop out. The ﬁnal formula for social welfare is
Ws = −θuC
(
θ
2σ
c2s +
(1 − θ)
2σ
g2s +
1
2ψ
y2s +
1
2
(
1
ψ
+
1

)
varz yˆs(z)
)
.
Woodford (2003a) has shown that
∞
∑
t=0
βtvarz yˆs(z) =
∞
∑
t=0
βt
γ2
(1 − γβ)(1 − γ)π
2
t ,
so, using a conventional notation for gap variables, we get the ﬁnal
formula for the social welfare function:
Ws = − θ( + ψ)γuC2ψ(1 − γβ)(1 − γ)
(
κ

(
θ
σ
c2t +
(1 − θ)
σ
g2t +
1
ψ
y2t
)
+ π2t
)
= − θ( + ψ)γuC
2ψ(1 − γβ)(1 − γ)
(
ρcc
2
s + ρgg
2
s + ρyy
2
s + π
2
s
)
,
which, after normalization, is (15) in the main text with ρc = κθσ ,
ρg =
κ(1−θ)
σ , ρy =
κ
ψ .
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